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ABSTRACT 
International studies have reported that injuries and complications during hospital admissions 
affect nearly 1 in 10 patients and that up to 50 % are the direct result of errors and therefore 
preventable. In Sweden, the figures are similar. The often cited report, To err is human – 
building a safer health system by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) emphasises the system 
approach in preventing future errors by designing safety into systems and not to blame 
individuals for past errors. This approach has also been implemented into the Swedish 
healthcare system through the Patient Safety Act and through the formation of a new agency 
in 2013, the Health and Social Care Inspectorate (IVO). Emergency departments (EDs) have 
a front position in Swedish healthcare in that a high percentage of patients have their first 
contact with hospital care in EDs. The ED environment has been described as complex and 
dynamic and one in which errors often occur. Research on patient safety in the ED has 
increasingly grown, with recent findings indicating that crowding, interruptions and 
multitasking all contribute to errors. However, there remains little knowledge on patient 
safety in Swedish EDs.  
The overall aim of this thesis was therefore to increase our knowledge about errors, 
interruptions and staff experience of patient safety risks in the ED. The specific aims in paper 
I and II were to describe the incidence and types of reported errors and complaints in ED care 
and their contributing factors. In paper III the aims were to explore interruptions occurring 
during common activities of clinicians and their perceptions of interruptions. The final paper 
was designed to describe physicians and registered nurses’ (RNs) perceptions and 
management of patient safety risks in the ED.  
In this descriptive project qualitative and quantitative data were collected from national 
registries and through observations of and interviews with ED clinicians. Data were analysed 
using qualitative content analysis and non-parametric statistics. 
The results represent the frequencies and characteristics of reported errors and complaints in 
Swedish ED care. The overall result shows that the most common errors that care providers, 
healthcare staff and patients reported were those concerned with diagnostic procedures, 
treatments and organisational matters. The contributing factors to errors in cases reported to 
the National Board of Health and Welfare were multifactorial: the most common contributing 
factor was human error that occurred most often during diagnostic procedures, followed by 
factors in the local environment. Interruptions took place most often on a face-to-face basis 
and during information exchange. Preparation of medication was the most interrupted activity 
in relative terms. Interruptions were not always perceived as negative, and negative feelings 
of interruptions were related to a disturbed work process. The physicians and RNs perceived 
high workload as the main patient safety concern in the ED. The most common strategy to 
prevent errors was to check and double check. Because the RNs felt responsible for managing 
patient safety risks, they reported using a strategy of taking command and control if they felt 
that patient safety was in jeopardy.  
The level of information detail varied and was sometimes missing in the different national 
and local registries. Further, we found that internal investigations and root cause analysis 
  
were sometimes missing entirely. These shortcomings constitute a risk of missing important 
patient safety risks and limit the development of solutions that can improve such safety. 
Latent conditions, such as high workload, were rarely identified and interruptions were ever 
identified as a contributing factor in cases reported to the National Board of Health and 
Welfare. The clinicians perceived high workload as the main patient safety concern in the 
emergency department. Interruptions during high workload were seen as increasing the risk 
for communication and medication errors. Some RNs taking command and control when 
patient safety was threatened indicating that RNs may play an important role in patient safety. 
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PREFACE 
The emergency department in Falun has been my working place as a registered nurse and as 
responsible for quality improvement for the past 20 years. It is a special and exciting work 
place characterized by a high degree of complexity involving collaboration with other 
departments and professionals both inside and outside the hospital. This collaboration is 
central for the workflow and working conditions in the hospital in general and in the 
emergency department. The workflow can change dramatically within minutes change from 
being “normal” to being chaotic and overwhelming. However, the collaboration with 
colleagues in the management of patients is both stimulating and challenging. During more 
intense and unpredictable times, I have often wondered how everything could go as well as it 
does.   
Therefore, when asked to participate in a research project on patient safety in the emergency 
department I immediately said yes. Initially, my role was to participate in the data collection 
of interruptions in the emergency department; I soon enrolled as a doctoral student at the 
Department of Medicine, Solna at Karolinska Institutet. It has been exciting and stimulating 
and it has strengthened my belief that emergency department staff has an important 
knowledge about errors, interruptions and situations at risk for patient safety that should be 
used in patient safety work.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Access to healthcare is essential, but it is also an area where patients may be exposed to 
injuries or complications caused by medical management or healthcare interventions. These 
unintended injuries or complications can result in death, disability or prolonged hospital stay. 
In the USA, studies have estimated that up to 98 000 people die each year as a result of 
injuries and complications in hospital care and that more than a half of these resulted from 
errors that could have been prevented (1). In Sweden, a study reported that approximately 
105 000 patients suffered preventable injuries in hospital, of which 3000 may have 
contributed to death during a period of one year (2). EDs have a front position in Swedish 
healthcare in that a high percentage of patients have their first contact with hospital care in 
the ED. The ED is considered as a complex and dynamic high risk area that is especially 
prone to errors (1, 3). However, limited research has been completed on patient safety in 
Swedish EDs. Therefore, the area of interest in this thesis is patient safety in Swedish EDs, 
with a focus on errors, interruptions and staff experience of patient safety risks.  
 
1.1 THE EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT 
 
 
The number of patients seeking care in the ED internationally (4) as well as in Sweden has 
increased every year since 2004, although the number of hospital-based EDs in Sweden has 
decreased (5, 6). In 2013, there were about 2.4 million visits to 70 hospital-based EDs in 
Sweden (7). The main task to be performed in EDs is to provide safe emergency care to 
acutely ill or injured patients 24 hours a day. The ED is characterised by unscheduled visits, 
inconsistent arrivals of patients and the multiple care of patients with a wide variety of 
conditions and acuity (from non-urgent to resuscitation situations). The workload is 
uncontrolled and unpredictable; decisions are often made under intense pressure and 
interventions with sometimes incomplete information of the patient. Time pressure is more 
intense in the EDs than on unit floors and ED staff members must constantly shift their 
attention and priorities to optimise care.  
 
The ED environment is complex and dynamic, involving multiple processes simultaneously 
that interact and are interdependent both inside and outside the ED, including collaboration 
with the radiology and operation wards. Working conditions such as crowding, interruptions 
and multitasking (managing multiple tasks simultaneously) are an integral part of the ED 
work environment. In Sweden, EDs are organised based on different medical specialties (e.g., 
internal medicine, surgery and orthopaedics). The physicians in the ED are consultants, 
residents and junior doctors from different specialities that are scheduled on an on-call basis. 
There is a shortage of emergency physicians in Sweden because the specialty is relatively 
new (5). Further, there is also a shortage of specialty training different professionals groups 
(e.g., RNs and licensed practical nurses, LPNs).  
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The ED involves several processes. Internationally, these processes are similar (an example 
from Canada is depicted in figure 1). At the arrival to the ED, the patient’s complaints are 
presented and the main task that follows is to assess the patient’s level of urgency. RNs assess 
the patient’s level of urgency to determine the order in which patients should be attended to, a 
process referred to as triage. Triage was implemented to ED care in order to ensure patient 
safety in the crowded ED that is to prevent seriously ill patients from dying while waiting for 
their turn (8). Thereafter, ED physicians are presented complaints and vital signs and from 
this information decide on diagnostic procedures, plausible diagnosis and proper treatment.  
 
  
 
Figure 1. Patient flow in the ED as exemplified in a model by Laskowski and co-workers (9).  
1.2 PATIENT SAFETY 
 
Patient safety is a concept that includes safety in all processes in the entire healthcare system 
and is an important part of quality in healthcare. The World Health Organisation (WHO) 
defines patient safety as “the absence of preventable harm to a patient during the process of 
health care” (10). Over the past decade, patient safety has been recognised as an important 
global topic and WHO acts as a major force for patient safety improvement around the world.  
The Harvard Medical Practice Study in 1991 and the report from the IOM in the USA in 
1999 were the starting point for increased development and research efforts to reduce errors 
and improve patient safety (1, 11, 12). The main conclusion in the IOM report “To err is 
human” was that errors most commonly are caused by faulty systems, processes and 
conditions in the organisation and not by individual recklessness.  
 
In Sweden, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, together with all 
county councils and regions responsible for healthcare, launched a national effort to improve 
patient safety in 2008 (13). Some of the initial areas for improvement were healthcare 
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associated infections, fall injuries and pressure ulcers associated with care. Further, a new law 
was launched in Sweden in 2011 with the aim to promote patient safety (14).  
The Harvard Medical Practice Study showed that nearly 4% of patients’ suffered an adverse 
event during hospital admission (11, 12). Since then, several countries have replicated the 
Harvard Medical Practice Study, demonstrating that adverse events during hospital admission 
affected nearly 1 out of 10 patients and that up to 50% of these were preventable (15-21).  
 
In Sweden, the figures are similar. A Swedish study, based on the Harvard Medical Practice 
Study protocol, demonstrated that about 12% of patients in hospital care experienced an 
adverse event, of which 70% were preventable (2). Two studies from the USA estimated that 
3% of adverse events took place in the ED; in Sweden, these figures are not available (11, 
21). 
 
1.3 PATIENT SAFETY CONCEPTS 
 
While there are several terms and concepts used in the patient safety literature, consensus 
about definitions are nevertheless lacking. Both WHO and the European Union (EU) have 
proposed a conceptual framework for international classification and vocabulary on patient 
safety (22, 23). Terms vary regarding acts or situations that result in actual or potential patient 
harm (e.g., events, incidents, (medical) errors, preventable adverse events or unnecessary 
harm). Further, these terms are often difficult to translate and compare with Swedish terms 
and definitions. During the work with this thesis, an attempt to use few terms and references 
has been sought with the aim to be clear and adequate. The terms used are adverse event and 
error, of which error is the main focus in this thesis. Together they include most terms 
relevant to patient safety. 
 
Adverse event 
When patients experience harm while receiving healthcare, it is called adverse events. The 
definition of adverse event used in this thesis is “an injury or complication that is caused by 
medical management or interventions, rather than the underlying disease” (1, 22). Adverse 
events can be preventable or non-preventable (1). A preventable adverse event is the result of 
an error (e.g., giving the wrong drug to a patient). Patient harm can also occur without being 
the result of an error and is then referred to as a non-preventable adverse event. An example 
of a non-preventable adverse event is an anaphylactic reaction to a drug given to a patient 
without a previous known allergy to the drug (1).  
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Error 
The concepts “error” and “medical error” are used interchangeably in the patient safety 
literature. An error is a failure that occurs in healthcare and refers to failed processes and does 
not necessarily include harm (24, 25). In this thesis the following definition of error is used: a 
failure made in the process of care that results in or has the potential to result in severe harm 
to patients (1, 23). The term error in this thesis is used to include commonly used terms such 
as mistakes, failures, near misses and incidents. A serious error involves a risk of death, 
physical or psychological injury that is permanent (14). The probability that an error will 
occur is called a risk (22).  
 
1.4 WHY DO ERRORS OCCUR 
 
Patient safety work in health care has its origin from high risk areas such as nuclear- and 
aircraft industry (1). Human error is the human contribution to errors and one of the greatest 
contributors to accidents in high-risk industries and healthcare (1). The report “To err is 
human” by IOM  in 1999, placed particular emphasis on preventing future errors by 
designing safety into systems and not blame individuals for past errors. This systematic 
approach also referred to as the human factor approach acknowledges that “humans are 
fallible and errors are to be expected even in the best organizations” (26). Errors made by 
humans are the result of latent errors in the work environment. The human factor approach 
replaced the former individual approach, which assumes that a person is responsible and 
should be blamed for an error (1, 26-28). Research in this area focuses on the relationship 
between humans and complex sociotechnical systems (1, 29, 30) in order to understand why 
systems or processes break down.  
 
In recent years behavioural science has had a central role in trying to understand and explain 
why and how errors occur, exemplified in accident models. The Swiss cheese model of 
organisational accidents developed by Reason (26) is one model developed to provide 
explanations as to why errors occur based on the contribution of human, technological and 
organisational factors. The Swiss cheese model emphasises that every complex system has 
defences and barriers that protect potential victims from hazards. The defences and barriers 
(the slice of a cheese) could be alarms, automatic shutdowns, procedures, routines, 
administrative controls but also staff. The defences and barriers are mostly effective, but there 
are always weaknesses (the hole in the cheese). The weaknesses arise for two reasons: active 
and latent errors, but most errors involve a combination of these two. The active errors are the 
unsafe acts committed by staff in direct contact with the patient or system. Latent errors are 
often unrecognised in complex systems and may lie dormant for many years before they 
combine with active errors and thereby jeopardise patient safety (1, 26). A stressful 
environment, high workload and inadequate systems of supervision or communication are 
examples of latent errors (26, 29, 31). Latent errors are considered the greatest threat to 
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patient safety (32). The ED is a complex system (33) and latent errors in the environment are 
for example, human interactions with technology, high workload, multitasking, and 
interruptions that result in cognitive overload (24, 34, 35).  
 
Several methods to analyse why and how an error occurs have been developed. The root 
cause analysis has been adapted and translated into Swedish and is used when serious errors 
have occurred (36). This structured method has its origins in the USA and includes a protocol 
that begins with a reconstruction of the error through record reviews and interviews with 
participants. A multidisciplinary team should then analyse the sequences of events that lead 
to the error. The system approach is central to the root cause analysis that is to identify 
underlying problems and avoid focusing on mistakes made by individuals. A goal is to 
identify both active and latent errors to prevent future errors by eliminating the latent errors 
(37).  
 
A framework of risk factors for use in healthcare was developed by Vincent and co-workers 
and based on Reasons accident model (26, 29). The framework consists of components that 
are important in healthcare such (e.g., patient characteristics and teamwork). The framework 
allows a systematic approach and has different uses, including analysis of events, or design 
and validation of risk assessment instruments. A framework for classifying factors that 
contribute to errors in the ED was later developed by Cosby as based on the framework of 
Vincent and co-workers (38). 
 
1.5 ERROR REPORTING 
 
As in all healthcare environments, error reporting in the ED is an important tool for detecting 
safety issues, which can result in identifying solutions, learning from errors and enhancing 
patient safety (1, 39). The National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen), in 
Sweden, estimated that approximately one million risks and errors were reported in local 
incident reporting systems from all healthcare sectors in 2001. However, many similar errors 
occur but are not always reported and thus unknown errors are assumed to be large (40). 
Patient safety research in emergency care is difficult because of the complexity of the ED 
environment, as well as the inability to fully capture all errors (41). Improving patient safety 
depends on the ability of healthcare providers to accurately identify, disclose and report errors 
(41). However collecting reports without doing anything with the information in order to 
improve patient safety is not useful (1). 
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1.5.1 Error reporting from healthcare staff and care providers 
Local incident reporting systems  
According to the law in Sweden, it is mandatory for all healthcare staff to report risks and 
errors into local incident reporting systems (42). If a serious error has occurred and reported, 
the care providers are obliged, according to the Lex Maria law (43), to also report it to a 
government agency, namely the Health and Social Care Inspectorate.  
 
Health and Social Care Inspectorate (IVO)  
According to Lex Maria law, care providers should report all serious errors to the IVO. From 
June 1st 2013, the IVO is under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. Before IVO 
existed, these serious errors were reported to the National Board of Health and Welfare. The 
number of Lex Maria reports has increased every year since 2005, which could be explained 
partly by reports of suicide that were included to Lex Maria in 2006. The increased focus on 
patient safety issues in Sweden and the increased number of reports indicate not a decline but 
rather an improvement in identifying and reporting errors and patient safety risks (44).  
A problem, however, both internationally and in Sweden, is the known underreporting to 
these systems. The unknown number of errors is assumed to be large because many similar 
errors occur but they are not always reported (1, 40, 45-48). Reasons not to report errors are 
among others time constraints, fear of reprisal, sense of futility and lack of feedback (45, 46, 
49). Serious errors that should be reported according to Lex Maria are not always reported in 
the local incident reporting systems as they should be. These errors are considered a problem 
and a risk of missing serious errors (50). Further, serious errors according to Lex Maria are 
underreported to a greater extent in comparison with the Patient Insurance (LÖF) (47).  
 
1.5.2 Complaints from patients or their proxies 
 
Patients or their proxies can report complaints about the care they have received to IVO, 
(before IVO to the Medical Responsibility Board, HSAN), Patients’ Advisory Committees 
(Patientnämnderna) and actual injuries to the Patient Insurance.  
 
Health and Social Care Inspectorate (IVO)  
Complaints about care and treatment can be reported to IVO. The report should include 
which care centre or hospital the complaints relate to and a description of the event and when 
it occurred. IVO investigates the event and the main focus is the system approach. 
 
The Medical Responsibility Board (HSAN)  
Before 2011, complaints from patients or their proxies were reported to the Medical 
Responsibility Board. These complaints include a notification of an individual healthcare 
staff and the investigation made by the board was conducted to identify whether the 
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individual healthcare staff was responsible for the error and would be blamed. The board still 
remains and investigates the responsibility of the individual healthcare staff. However, only 
the National Board of Health and Welfare can make these reports. The reports to the Medical 
Responsibility Board were considered valuable as part of patient safety work, and the 
National Board of Health and Welfare found that more than a third of the cases contained one 
or more risks for patient safety (40).   
 
The Patients’ Advisory Committees (Patientnämnderna) 
The Patients’ Advisory Committee is available in every county council and is an independent 
authority to which patients can turn to with complaints in the care or treatment they have 
received. The Committee can assist with information to patients or their proxies needed for 
them to get in contact with health care staff or to connect patients to the right government 
agency if needed. The complaints are mainly related to wrong or delayed treatment. 
Complaints to the Committees is thought to confirm patient safety risks and that they 
contribute to increased patient safety in the healthcare sector (40). International research 
confirms that patients are valuable in identifying risks for patient safety and errors in 
healthcare including EDs (51-53). 
 
Patient Insurance 
Further, patients or their proxies can also request for compensation from the Patient Insurance 
if they had suffered an injury from healthcare. All Swedish county councils and regions have 
an agreement with the Patient Insurance.  
 
1.6 ERRORS IN THE EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT 
 
The numbers of ED errors is estimated in some international studies, although using different 
methodologies and terms such as incidents or adverse events (39, 54-62). One study reported 
number of ED errors in 18 per 100 (18 %) patients (54) whereas another study reported 22 
per 1000 (2.2 %) patients (55). Further, a study reported that 24 of 399 (6 %) patients were 
involved in adverse events of which 17 were preventable (56). Common categorisations of 
errors are into which process in the ED care they occurred: for example, during triage or, 
diagnostic, treatment or medication procedures. Two common processes in the ED where 
errors occur are during diagnostic (54, 56, 63-67) and medication procedures (68-70). Errors 
in diagnostic procedures are e.g. missed or delayed diagnoses because of the failure to order 
e.g. appropriate test or act on test results. 
Another common type of error reported from international studies in the ED are 
communication failures (39, 54, 67, 71-80) which is because communication load in the ED 
is considered high (71, 73, 74, 77, 79, 81). The most common activity reported from two EDs 
in Sweden were information exchange between clinicians (82). Failures in communication 
have been reported in the USA to be the leading cause to serious errors (83), Failures in 
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communication can be, for example, information gaps, which is important patient information 
that is not transferred between clinicians or between care givers (78, 79, 84). In Sweden, an 
audit regarding patient safety in six EDs from The National Board of Health and Welfare in 
2005 indicated that there were deficiencies in information transfers between care givers (3). 
 
1.7 PATIENT SAFETY RISKS IN THE EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT 
 
In the USA, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) published a report in 
2003 on the effects of healthcare working conditions on patient safety. The conclusions were 
that an increase in staffing levels in inpatient wards will likely improve patient outcomes and 
reduced interruptions will likely decrease the incidence of errors (85). A recent study reported 
that an increase in the workload of RNs by one patient in inpatient wards increases the 
likelihood of inpatient hospital mortality by 7% (86). In Sweden, a study reported that RNs’ 
perceptions of patient safety working with inpatient care were strongly related to having 
adequate staffing and resources (87).  
 
Knowledge about staff experience and perceptions of patient safety risks in the ED and their 
management of risks seem to be scarce. One survey in the USA reported that ED physicians’ 
greatest concerns for patient safety were crowding, availability to consultants and nursing 
shortages (88). Another survey in the USA reported that ED staff perceived that the physical 
environment, staffing and information coordination were factors of greatest concern for 
patient safety (89). One interview study of ED staff members in the United Kingdom reported 
that perceived stress factors were the 4-hour target, high workload, staff shortages and lack of 
teamwork (80). The goal of the 4-hour target, launched in 2000, was that patients would be 
assessed, treated and admitted to the hospital within 4 hours. Another interview study in the 
USA with 20 emergency RNs reported that RNs were aware of potential errors, played an 
active role in the recovery of errors and that experience played a major role in the ability to 
recover errors. Some methods used to identify and recover errors included surveillance, 
anticipation, double checking and experiential knowing (90). In addition, inadequate 
equipment and inexperienced staff have been reported to affect staff performance and result 
in errors in the ED (58, 59, 64).  
In an audit of six EDs in Sweden in 2004 by the National Board of Health and Welfare it was 
reported that among others high workload, waiting times, inexperienced staff and electronic 
health care records were perceived by staff as risk factors for patient safety (3). However, 
there is a lack of research that can confirm these findings and insufficient knowledge about 
how Swedish ED staff manage these risk factors. Research is growing internationally 
regarding ED patient safety and factors such as crowding, interruptions and multitasking are 
considered factors contributing to errors (91-93). 
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Crowding 
In the ED, workload is a related phenomenon to crowding with potential mutual effects 
between the two (94). ED crowding has been considered a major threat to patient safety (4, 
95) and it has been suggested that ED crowding is a response to a dysfunctional healthcare 
system (4).  
The American definition of crowding is “a situation in which the identified need for 
emergency services outstrips available resources in the ED, hospital or both” (89). ED 
crowding has been recognised in the literature for over 20 years (96), and a growing body of 
data suggests that ED crowding is associated with objective outcomes (such as mortality) and 
clinically important processes of care (such as time to treatment for patients with time-
sensitive conditions such as pneumonia and for patients with severe pain) (95, 97). ED 
crowding has also been associated with higher rates of patients leaving without ever being 
seen (98) higher rates of errors in specific diagnosis such as myocardial infarction (99), and 
medication errors (100).  
In the United Kingdom, the term crowding in the ED has been named as “waits” and the 
solution was the 4-hour target, where patients were assessed, treated and admitted within 4 
hours. Although the effect is uncertain, the 4-hour target has been adopted in other countries, 
including Sweden (98). Crowding and waiting times have been recently set on the national 
agenda by the Swedish government. In 2010, The Swedish National Board of Health and 
Welfare has been commissioned to investigate and propose a system to measure waiting 
times in Swedish hospital-based EDs (101). In a 2013 report it was noted that patients’ length 
of stay had increased and that there were major differences between EDs in length of stay and 
waiting times. In addition to measure waiting times, the National Board of Health and 
Welfare highlighted the need for quality indicators for care with focus on patient safety and 
patient satisfaction (101). Further, there is a lack of comprehensive knowledge and research 
about patient flow and processes in the EDs and there is no adequate Swedish definition of 
crowding (102, 103).  
While most international studies and reviews have described the negative effect on patient 
outcomes, crowding is also considered to have a negative effect on staff workload. Crowding 
contributes to stress and ED staff are more likely to be interrupted during a task; both of these 
factors (stress and interruption) reduce productivity and effectiveness (4, 96).   
 
Interruptions  
To be interrupted during a task can lead to memory failures and result in an error (32). An 
interruption is defined as “a break in the performance of a human activity initiated by a 
source internal or external to the recipient, with occurrence situated within a context of a 
setting or location. This break results in the suspension of the initial task by initiating the 
performance of an unplanned task with the assumption that the initial task will be resumed” 
(104) (p E38).  
Interruptions are a complex phenomenon (92) that has been studied in psychology (105) and 
behavioral science (93). In a review of psychological literature, it is reported that 
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interruptions have negative effects on clinical tasks (e.g., more risk-taking behaviours in the 
decision-making process and faster task completion to the expense of increased perceived 
stress) (105). A primary task is the main activity, and an interruption is a secondary activity 
that requires attention and stops the primary task. Although some interruptions may be 
necessary, an interrupt-driven environment is prone to distraction and therefore potentially to 
error (106). Studies have shown that there is information loss due to interruptions (93). An 
important factor that has an impact on the interruption effect is high working memory load 
(105), and forgetting to carry out tasks in the future is one of the most common failures 
occurring because of an interruption during high working memory load (32, 105, 107).  
In healthcare the IOM, described interruption as a contributing factor to errors in their 
acclaimed report from 1999 (1). Later, the AHRQ in the USA in 2003 argued that reducing 
interruptions will probably decrease errors (85). Research on interruptions and their 
contribution to errors in healthcare has since then increased dramatically. The definition of an 
interruption still varies (92), although a concept analysis of the concept interruption has been 
conducted (104). Because definitions and instruments used to study interruptions are not 
standardised, comparison of studies is difficult (92).  
Interruptions seem to be more frequent in the ED than in other healthcare settings (76, 108-
110). In other countries, research on interruptions in the ED has focused on counting 
interruptions in observational studies (73, 106, 111-116). Studies on ED physicians’ show an 
interruption rate between 5 to 12 times per hour (106, 110, 111, 113, 115). The number of 
interruptions of RNs in the ED has been seldom studied, but one study reported 11 
interruptions per hour in a level one trauma centre (117) and 3 per hour reported from 
observations of 30 RNs in three major academic EDs (116). However, interruptions of 
registered RNs during medication management have been studied in both wards (69, 118-
120) and in EDs (68, 70, 116) and are believed to contribute to medication errors. One study 
reports that occurrence and frequency of interruptions were significantly associated with 
medication errors (121).  
Interruptions have mostly been considered negative, but interruptions are a complex 
phenomenon, and it has been suggested that interruptions may sometimes be necessary to 
ensure safety (92, 107, 117, 119) e.g. to be aware of a patient’s deteriorating condition or 
prevent a medication error. The impact on the individual and outcome of an interruption may 
differ because of several factors: the primary task that is interrupted, the cognitive state of the 
individual, the workload during the interruption and the interruption itself (92, 122). It is 
argued that healthcare researchers need to reach a consensus on the definition of interruption 
and to develop a theoretical base to understand the complex phenomena of interruptions (92, 
107). 
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Multitasking 
Multitasking is closely connected to interruption. Some authors propose that research also 
must include methods that can distinguished between the concepts (122). Multitasking is 
managing multiple tasks at the same time (108). Multitasking is an integral and necessary 
skill in the ED, although multitasking creates higher working memory load (93). Of two 
Danish studies based on questionnaires to ED physicians and RNs, one reported frequent 
interruptions as the most common stress factor (123). The other study reported that cognitive 
demands (e.g. multitasking) and poor patient safety climate had the highest impact on the 
occurrence of errors (124). 
 
In summary, research is increasingly growing internationally regarding patient safety and 
how to reduce errors and improve patient safety in the ED. Despite efforts to increase 
knowledge about patient safety risks, through the implementation of mandatory reporting 
systems, there remain knowledge gaps, partly due to underreporting. Two studies from the 
USA estimated that 3 % of adverse events in healthcare occurred in the ED. Several 
international studies have reported that common types of error in the ED are diagnostic, 
medication and communication errors. Commonly reported contributing factors to errors in 
the ED are crowding, interruptions and multitasking. In Sweden, there is a lack of knowledge 
and overview of reported numbers, type and contributing factors to errors in relation to ED 
care. There is also a lack of research on interruptions that can confirm previous findings and 
generalisability to Swedish ED care. Further, there is a lack of knowledge about physicians 
and RNs perceptions of patient safety risks in Swedish EDs. 
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2 AIMS 
The overall aim of this thesis was to describe patient safety in Swedish EDs with respect to 
errors, interruptions and staff experience of patient safety risks. 
Table 1. Overview of the four papers. 
Paper Aim Design and data 
collection method 
Sample Analysis 
I 
 
To describe the 
incidence and types 
of reported error 
and complaint in 
ED care.  
 
 
Descriptive, survey. 
Registry data and 
questionnaires. 
 
Reported errors and 
complaints from Swedish EDs 
to three national authorities 
and local incident reporting 
systems.   
The National Board of Health 
and Welfare (n=64).  
The Medical Responsibility 
Board (n=306). 
Patients Advisory Committees 
(n=1341). 
Local incident reports (n=47). 
 
Qualitative 
content 
analysis. 
II To describe 
contributing factors 
to errors occurring 
in EDs. 
Descriptive. Registry 
data. 
Errors reported from EDs to 
the National Board of Health 
and Welfare in 2009 (n=64) at 
35 hospital based EDs.  
Qualitative 
content analysis. 
III To explore 
interruptions 
occurring during 
common activities 
of clinicians 
working in the EDs. 
 
Descriptive. 
Observation and 
interviews. 
18 clinicians (6 physicians, 6 
RNs, 6 LPNs) from two 
hospital- based EDs, 9 from 
one large university hospital 
and 9 from one medium- sized 
county hospital. 
Non-parametric 
statistics and 
qualitative 
content analysis. 
IV To identify factors 
that ED clinicians 
perceive as patient 
safety risks and to 
study how 
clinicians manage 
these factors. 
Descriptive. 
Interviews. 
 
20 clinicians (10 physicians 
and 10 RNs). 10 from one large 
university hospital and 10 from 
one medium-sized hospital. 
Qualitative 
content analysis. 
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3 MATERIAL AND METHODS 
This chapter describes the study context, data sources, data collection procedures and 
methods used in the four papers, which are referred to in the text by their Roman numerals. 
3.1 STUDY CONTEXT  
 
The Swedish healthcare system  
The study context is the Swedish healthcare system and hospital-based EDs. Sweden has 20 
county councils or regions that are responsible for providing healthcare to the inhabitants 
(125). IVO is a government agency under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, which on 
June 1st  2013 was transferred from the National Board of Health and Welfare. The main task 
of  IVO, which supervises health and medical care, is to monitor that healthcare is safe and of 
good quality in accordance with the Patient safety law and other regulations (14).  
The agency also manages errors reported by care providers, and from 2012 handles 
complaints filed by patients or their proxies. Until 2011, patients or their proxies could file a 
complaint to the Medical Responsibility Board regarding the care and treatment they have 
received. From 2012, the complaints are directed to IVO. According to the Patient Safety Act 
(14), it is mandatory for care providers to report serious errors to the agency. The chief 
medical director of the healthcare organisation which decides if a report of a serious error is 
to be reported to the agency. If so, the healthcare organisation is required to investigate the 
event of interest and conduct an event analysis. Then, the agency investigates the event, 
performs reviews of health records, conducts event analysis and interviews staff members 
who were involved in the case. Based on this data, the agency recommends and decides 
actions in accordance with the systematic approach (e.g., changes in routines). 
The Patients Advisory Committee is an independent authority to which patients can turn to 
with complaints regarding the care or treatment they have received. Another tasks for the 
committee is to provide information to patients or their proxies so they can contact healthcare 
staff or to connect patients to the right authority if needed. The number of complaints to all 
the committees has increased from 18 500 in 2000 to 29 500 in 2012 (126).   
 
Emergency Departments 
In Swedish healthcare there were 72 hospital-based EDs for ill and injured adults in 2009 that 
were included in paper I and II. This figure decreased to 70 EDs in 2013 (6, 7). Of these 72 
EDs in 2009, two were included in paper III and IV.  
Of the two EDs included in the observations of interruptions and interviews with staff, one 
was a level one trauma centre, located at a large urban university hospital with an annual 
patient flow of 72 000 and 82 000 in 2009 and 2012 respectively. The staff at the ED 
consisted of physicians (including emergency physicians), RNs and LPNs from different 
specialties and with various level of experience (consultants, residents and juniors).  
The other ED was located at a medium-sized county hospital with a patient flow of 49 000 
annually in 2009 and 58 000 in 2012. The staff at the ED consisted of physicians, RNs and 
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LPNs from different specialties, with various levels of experience (consultants, residents and 
juniors). None of the physicians at the county hospital were emergency physicians. 
 
3.2 DATA SOURCES   
 
Five data sources were used in the four papers: 
1. Lex Maria cases reported to the National Board of Health and Welfare       
(Socialstyrelsen)    
2. Patient complaints reported to The Medical Responsibility Board (HSAN)  
3. Patient complaints reported to Patients Advisory Committee (Patientnämnden) 
4. Errors reported to incident reporting systems 
5. Interview and observation data from ED clinicians at two EDs 
The National Board of Health and Welfare (I, II)  
In 2009, 1346 Lex Maria cases were reported to the National Board of Health and Welfare. 
After the investigation of a case made by the agency, a summary of the case a report (called 
“decision”), is publically accessible without personal data about patients and staff. The 
summary of the case contains sections that describe the basis for the investigation e.g. the 
notification, internal investigation and/or root cause analysis made by the care provider, 
interviews with staff and eventually an inspection by the agency. Further, a description of the 
event and the error that occurred, the care providers identified causes of the event and the 
care providers and agency assessment and demands for action. The reports were full text 
documents and no categorisations of errors were made by the agency. Further, the level of 
information in the cases varied in detail as well as the root cause analysis made by care 
providers. The Lex Maria cases were sorted by the agency into medical specialties in which 
cases from emergency care were assumed to be found. 
 
The Medical Responsibility Board (I)  
During 2009 there were 4628 complaints reported to the board. When the board had 
investigated the case, a summary of the case (called “decision”) was publically accessible in a 
visiting room at the board office. The summary contained a full text document with 
information of the healthcare staff that were notified, a description of the case, a description 
of the investigation including record reviews and/or interviews with staff and the decision of 
whether the healthcare staff were responsible, and if so, the disciplinary action to be taken. 
The board did not make any categorisations of the complaints and the level of information in 
the cases varied in detail. The cases were sorted by the board only according to case number. 
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Patients’ Advisory Committee (I)  
In 2009, there were 1341 complaints related to ED care reported to all committees. The 
complaints were presented in a varied level of detail: in numbers, in main categories and/or 
subcategories.  
 
Local incident-reporting systems (I)  
There was no uniform incident reporting system in use and there were numerous systems in 
various county councils and regions. The reported errors were presented in varied level of 
detail: in numbers, in main categories and/or subcategories. 
 
Interview data from two EDs (III, IV)  
In paper III, the sample comprised 18 clinicians (9 from the two EDs), 6 physicians, 6 RNs 
and 6 LPNs. The clinicians were selected by purposeful sampling based on their work 
experience. The reason for including these three groups of clinicians was to get a 
comprehensive perspective of  interruptions occurring in the ED. Variation in gender and 
length of work experience in ED care were sought. The work experience in ED care among 
the 18 clinicians ranged from 6 months to 30 years. Based on the length of work experience, 
the participants were distributed into three groups: junior, medium-experienced, and senior 
clinicians. One clinician from each profession at the two EDs was selected from each group 
to achieve variation in clinical experience.  Less than 6 months of work experience from ED 
care was considered as an exclusion criterion. 
In paper IV, the sample included 20 clinicians from the two EDs. To achieve varied and 
broad data a purposeful sample of participants was selected. The inclusion criteria were at 
least three years of professional experience from ED care. The sample consisted of 10 
physicians (residents in surgery, internal medicine or emergency medicine) and 10 RNs (5 
physicians and 5 RNs from each ED), whereof 11 were women. Ages ranged from 30-60 
years and ED experience from 3-30 years. 
3.3 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
This section describes the data collection and methodology adopted in the four papers.  
 
Reported errors and complaints in ED care (I) 
During 2009, 1346 Lex Maria cases were reported from care providers to the National Board 
of Health and Welfare. Of these 1346 cases, 524 were sorted under somatic specialised care 
according to the agency. These 524 cases were retrieved in a file from the agency and 
screened for inclusion in two stages (figure 2). 
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Figure 2. The screening process of cases reported to the National Board of Health and 
Welfare. 
The first screening was conducted to find cases from ED care. The inclusion criteria for the 
first screening included the following: the department was a hospital-based ED for 
somatically ill and injured adults, the heading of the case contained the word ED, or the 
description of the error indicated the possibility that it was related to ED care. The exclusion 
criteria were that the error had occurred in a non-hospital ED or at a specialised ED for 
children, or if the heading and its description indicated the error was not related to the ED. To 
reach consensus about cases to include the research group reviewed this first screening 
process several times. In the first screening process, 247 cases did not meet inclusion criteria, 
which resulted in 181 cases that were assessed to have occurred in ED care.  
In the second stage these 181 cases were ordered in full text from the agency and read 
through. The full text document is a summary of the case with a decision from the agency 
consisting of the following sections: basis (the basis for the agency’s investigation including 
the notification from the care provider, internal investigation, root cause analysis, interviews 
with staff and inspection by the agency), description of the case (a description of the event 
and the error that had occurred), the care providers identified causes of the event, the care 
providers actions and the agency’s assessment and demands for actions. The exclusion 
criterion in the second stage was cases that did not involve EDs: 117 cases did not involve 
ED care, resulting in a final sample of 64 cases. 
Reported medical errors
n= 1346
Sorted as specialized somatic 
care and screened for inclusion
n= 524
Screening process, first stage, 
contained several cases 
duplicated
excluded n= 96
 Cases possible for inclusion
n= 428
Screening process
second stage
Included
n= 64
Excluded
n= 247
Included
n= 181
Excluded
n= 117
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In total, 4629 complaints about perceived errors were reported from patients or their proxies 
to the Medical Responsibility Board in 2009. One complaint was a duplicate, resulting in 
4628 unique complaints. The decisions from the board were screened in two stages (figure 3) 
in attempt to capture complaints that had involved ED care. In the first stage, the publicly 
accessible decisions were screened in place, in the authority’s room for visitors. The inclusion 
and exclusion criteria for the initial screening were the same as for the National Board of 
Health and Welfare. The first screening resulted in 362 cases that were assessed to have 
occurred in ED care.  
In the second stage, exclusion criteria included complaints not involving ED care, incomplete 
complaints, statute-barred (more than two years old), withdrawn complaints, or complaints 
directed to the regional Patients’ Advisory Committees that had not been handled by the 
board. All complaints that involved ED care were included, resulting in a final sample of 306 
cases. 
       
 
 
 
 
   
      
      
  
 
   
      
      
      
      
  
 
   
      
      
      
      
      
      
Figure 3. The screening process of cases reported to the Medical Responsibility Board. 
All 21 regional Patients Advisory Committees were contacted by e-mail and asked for 
statistics regarding the number and types of complaints in ED care during 2009. Reminders 
were sent three times to non-responding committees in intervals of three weeks resulting in 
responses from all 21 committees and a final sample of 1341 complaints. 
A questionnaire was developed by the research team to collect data from the local incident 
reporting systems in use at Swedish county councils and regions. The questionnaire contained 
16 questions pertaining to number, types and classification of errors reported by staff. 
Additional questions covered number of ED patient visits per year, catchment area, type of 
hospital and type and name of local incident reporting systems. Finally, the remaining 
questions were about if and how the follow-up of errors was performed.  
RNs responsible for the incident reporting system at the EDs at one county and one local 
hospital tested the questionnaire in a pilot test resulting in minor revisions to the instrument. 
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The questionnaire was then sent to the head of the department of all 72 EDs in Swedish 
hospitals. Reminders were sent to non- responding EDs after two weeks and again after four 
weeks. Further reminders were made by telephone calls and e-mail during the following two 
months, resulting in a final sample of 47 EDs (65%). The respondents represented EDs from 
19 local, 19 county and 9 university hospitals. The non-responding EDs constituted 20 local, 
4 county and 1 university hospital.  
To identify the type of errors a qualitative content analysis approach was used (127), which 
refers to both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Frequencies of errors and complaints in 
each category were counted for all data sources. The analyses were inductive and the 
categorisations emerged from the written text. The cases from the National Board of Health 
and Welfare and from the Medical Responsibility Board were read in their entirety to acquire 
a general sense of the cases as a whole. The next step of analysis involved the identification 
of text that was related to the error that had occurred. The texts were extracted into meaning 
units. The meaning units were then condensed into codes (codes were a short description of 
the error that had occurred: e.g., “insufficient examination”). In the final step of the analysis 
the codes were sorted into categories based on their similarities. The categories represented a 
process in ED care (e.g.,“diagnostic procedures”) or a process related to staff performance 
(e.g., “documentation”) in which the error occurred. A sample of 5% of the cases was 
independently analysed by four of the researchers with the aim to establish consensus on the 
coding and categorisation. Revisions were made until consensus was achieved.   
The complaints from the Patients’ Advisory Committees were already categorised, although 
the level of detail of this categorisation varied. Eight (38%) committees reported the type of 
complaint in main categories while 12 committees (57%) reported both main and 
subcategories based on common predefined categories established by the Patients’ Advisory 
Committees. One committee only reported the number of complaints. No analysis was 
carried out in that we did not have access to the original complaints and therefore the 
predefined main categories by the Committees were used.  
Errors reported from the local incident reporting systems were presented in varying levels of 
detail (e.g., only number of errors, numbers and types of error or in predefined categories). In 
the analysis, types of error and the predefined categories of errors were coded. Coded errors 
with similar characteristics were categorised together. The research group discussed and 
revised the categorisations until consensus was reached. 
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Contributing factors to errors (II) 
The data collection of the Lex Maria cases that were reported to the National Board of Health 
and Welfare were the same as in paper I. This collection process resulted in 64 cases. For 
paper II, internal investigations and root cause analysis made by the care providers in the 64 
cases were ordered from the agency. Totally, 45 internal investigations were retrieved of 
which 35 were root cause analysis. 
Data were analysed by deductive content analysis (128) using Cosby’s framework (38) with 
predefined categories of factors contributing to errors in the ED. The framework, adapted 
from the work of Vincent and co-workers (29), was developed based on hundreds of cases of 
errors identified in the ED. The framework (table 2), which consists of 10 categories, has not 
yet been validated. Initially, in our analysis each case was read through in its entirety to 
determine a sense of the whole. Each case was then read a second time focusing on two 
sections: the causes of the event as identified by care providers and the authority’s assessment 
and demands for actions with the aim to identify contributing factors to the errors that had 
occurred. In addition, the section describing the identified causes in the root cause analysis 
was reviewed to find any additional information about the contributing factors. The extracted 
texts about the contributing factors (identified by either or both the care providers and the 
agency) were sorted into 10 predefined main categories using Cosby’s framework (38). To 
make a more detailed description of the contributing factors a subordinate categorical level 
was created for some categories. The subcategories were identified and labelled according to 
the framework. Totally, five cases were reviewed by a second researcher to establish 
consensus.   
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Table 2. Description of main categories of contributing factors to errors (38). 
 Contributing 
factor 
Summary  description of content 
1 Patient factors Patient characteristics e.g., critically ill, demented, delirious or 
under influence of substances, language and communication 
barriers or multiple diseases that may place the patient at risk. 
2,3 Outside systems and 
ED access 
Errors before arriving to the ED, such as society (e.g., nursing 
homes) or the emergency medical service (EMS). 
4 Triage Errors within the triage process. 
5 Teamwork failure With emphasis on communication between clinicians in teams, 
specialties, different levels of care (units outside the ED) and 
between patient and their proxies. This study distinguished face-
to-face communication, written information transfer and 
cooperation. 
 
6 The local ED 
environment (the 
micro system) 
Errors occur when the ED staff are stressed and overloaded. 
Relates also to keeping adequate resources (staffing), equipment 
and supplies for the unexpected. Routine functions, policies and 
guidelines. 
 
7 The hospital 
environment (the 
macro system) 
Hospital services such as consultants, inpatient beds and 
specialty treatments. 
 
8 Hospital 
administration and 
third parties 
Budgetary constraints, policies and regulations. 
 
9 Community level Care the patients receive after the ED visit, access and 
interaction to primary care and society’s health services. 
 
10 Human error  
 
Errors in planning: primarily cognitive, incorrect clinical 
assessment and flawed planned interventions. 
Errors in execution: the diagnostic work-up plan and treatment 
were not carried out as intended.  
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Interruptions in emergency department work (III)  
During a study period of eight days in 2009, 18 ED clinicians were observed while carrying 
out their work at two EDs. The observations were made at different times of the day and 
night (from 8 am to 3 am) and different weekdays (Monday to Thursday). Mondays were 
chosen because they are typically characterised by a high workload at the two EDs in this 
study. At both EDs, the observations were conducted on representative days for the ED 
environment, covering patients with different symptoms of varying urgency. The direct 
observations lasted for two hours each, in total 36 hours. Directly after the observations, a 
short (approximately 15 minutes) semi-structured interview was held by one of the observers 
with each observed clinician to let him or her reflect on their perceptions of interruptions that 
had occurred during the observation period. The interviews took place at an undisturbed 
location in the ED.  
Because no previous data collection protocol existed for the specific purpose of the present 
study, a protocol was developed based on previous studies within the research field (111, 129, 
130). The observations were conducted concurrently by two of the researchers, both RNs 
with extensive clinical experience from ED care. The two observers worked as a pair during 
data collection and observed the same clinician to help ensure that all conducted activities and 
interruptions were captured. The observers documented the continuous work process on a 
minute-to-minute basis as well as all received interruptions and self-interruptions 
(interruptions initiated by the clinicians themselves) that the clinicians were exposed to. The 
data recorded in the protocol were divided into six categories: (1) type of conducted activity 
(e.g., reading a patient’s chart), duration of the activity in minutes, (3) location and person 
involved in the activity, (4) occurrence of interruptions in each activity, (5) whether the 
observed clinician was a recipient of an interruption or caused self-interruptions, and (6) 
whether the previously observed activity was resumed after the interruption. Four pilot 
observations were conducted to test the protocol, resulting in minor changes. Interruptions of 
non-observed clinicians were not counted. No pre-defined categories were used to identify 
the clinicians’ activities during the observations and the researchers used their own words to 
describe their observations.  
Based on the observation data, frequencies of how often interruptions occurred in each 
activity and the locations in the EDs were counted. In a previously published study (82), 15 
categories of activities conducted by the clinicians were identified and 12 of these categories 
were used in this study in the analysis of frequencies of interruptions. Further, the type of 
clinician involved in the interruption, whether an activity was resumed after an interruption or 
not, and whether the observed clinician was involved in self-interruptions or was the recipient 
of an interruption were also counted. Chi-square analysis was used to analyse differences in 
being recipient of or causing self-interruptions for each category of clinicians. 
Inductive content analysis was used to analyse the interviews (127, 131). The whole text was 
subsequently extracted into meaning units and then the text was condensed and subcategories 
and categories developed (127). The interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim 
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and read through several times to get a sense of the whole. The text was extracted into 
meaning units. The meaning units were condensed and organised into subcategories and 
categories (table 3). The subcategories were divided into three domains that represented the 
locations in the ED where the interruption occurred, the clinicians need to interrupt someone 
else and the clinicians’ perceptions of interruptions. The data were primarily categorised by 
two of the authors. Consensus on the categories was reached through repeated discussions of 
the data in the research group until inter-rater agreement was attained.   
Table 3. Example of the analysis of the interviews with ED clinicians on their perceptions of 
interruptions during their work processes 
Meaning units                                 Condensation          Subcategories        Categories 
    
“I guess it was someone who asked 
me something.” (8: junior LPN) 
Occasional 
questions 
 
Infrequent 
communicative 
interruptions  
 
Undisturbed 
work process 
“There are other days when there 
are significantly more calls on the 
pager than today and then it 
(disturbance) gets obvious. There 
are usually many more pagings than 
there were today”(1: senior 
physician)
 
 
Many pagings are 
disturbing 
 
Frequent 
communicative 
interruptions 
Disturbed 
work process 
“No, normal (amount of 
interruptions). The phone rings, 
people ask you questions, but it 
isn’t something I get disturbed by.”  
(12: medium RN) 
 
Questions and 
phone calls part of 
the normal work 
environment 
 
Expectations of 
the work 
environment 
 
Undisturbed 
work process 
”I get disturbed by having to wait 
for the person who will help me 
make a decision. Yes, one gets 
disturbed by waiting”. (16: junior 
physician) 
Disturbed by 
waiting 
Waiting 
 
Disturbed 
work process 
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Perceptions of patient safety risks in the ED (IV) 
In 2012, two professional interviewers with experience from the healthcare sector carried out 
telephone interviews with 20 ED clinicians employed at two EDs. The interviewers contacted 
the participants by e-mail to schedule an interview. Telephone interviews were chosen for 
feasibility i.e. it is easier to schedule than a personal meeting and the participant can choose 
the most appropriate time. The interviews lasted 12-57 minutes (mean 30 minutes). All 
interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Initially, the interview guide was 
pilot-tested by the first author, while the professional interviewers were listening. The pilot-
test resulted in rearranging the order of some of the questions but no change of the content 
was needed. The semi-structured interview began with the question of whether the 
respondent had experience of patient safety risks in the ED. If so, the respondent was asked to 
describe the events or circumstances that were perceived as risks. Further questions covered 
the respondent’s experience of revealing and preventing errors and the feelings following the 
disclosure.  
The interviews were analysed using inductive content analysis (127, 132). The text from each 
interview was read by the first author several times to achieve a general sense of the whole. 
The text relating to the clinicians perceptions and management of patient safety risks was 
then extracted into meaning units, one consisting of the text relating to the clinicians 
perceptions and the other part relating to managing patient safety risks. Thereafter, the 
extracted texts about perceptions were condensed and coded. The codes, based on their 
similarities, were sorted into subcategories that represented the emerging category (table 4). 
Each step of the analysis was discussed within the research team. To ensure that the core 
concept was kept constant throughout the analysis, there was movement back and forth 
between the whole interview texts, meaning units, condensed texts and codes. Discussions 
regarding the analysis continued until consensus was achieved in the research group. The 
meaning units about managing patient safety risks was also condensed and coded. The codes 
were grouped into categories based on their similarities. 
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Table 4. Examples of the analysis of ED clinicians’ perceptions of patient safety risks. 
Meaning unit Condensed 
meaning unit 
Code Subcategory Category 
We have many 
emergency 
situations and many 
severely ill patients, 
which means that it 
may take time 
before the patient is 
assessed (1) 
 
Many emergency 
situations, many 
severely ill patients 
may result in 
delayed assessment 
of patients 
High workload 
results in delays of 
assessments  
High patient load High workload 
When there is a lot 
to do, my 
experience is that 
communication is 
lacking. When you 
are busy 
performing your 
task with the aim to 
move forward,  
communication 
between teams is 
lacking (1) 
When there is a lot 
to do,  
communication is 
lacking because 
you are too busy to 
come  forward  
The communication 
fails when there is 
high workload 
 Lack of 
information 
Communication 
failure 
 
3.4 RESEARCH ETICS 
The studies were approved by the Regional Ethical Review Board in Stockholm (Dnr: 
2009/1413-31/4, 2012/2237-32)). For paper I and II, the filed reports of the errors and 
complaints to all the above-mentioned authorities are publicly accessible documents and no 
personal identifiable data were used. For paper III and IV, the managers of the EDs gave their 
permission and each participating clinician gave written informed consent. For paper III, 
information to patients about the study was posted in the ED waiting rooms. Because some of 
the observed activities were patient-related, the observers sometimes refrained from 
following the clinicians’ into examining rooms to protect patient integrity. In other situations, 
i.e. if the patients were involved in the observed activities, the patients were asked for 
informed consent. 
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4 RESULT 
In this chapter results for the four papers are presented. 
4.1 REPORTED ERRORS AND COMPLAINTS IN ED CARE (I) 
During 2009, errors and complaints related to diagnostic procedures were reported most 
frequently to the National Board of Health and Welfare, and to the Medical Responsibility 
Board. Errors and complaints related to care and treatment were reported most often to the 
local incident reporting systems and to the Patients’ Advisory Committees. In all registries 
combined (table 5) the most common category of errors and complaints was related to care 
and treatment (24.3%), followed by organisation, routines and resources (19.0%) and 
unspecified medical errors (14.5%). 
Table 5. Overview of numbers and types of error and complaint from Swedish national, 
regional and local incident reporting registries during 2009. 
Category for type of error and 
complaint 
The 
National 
Board of 
Health 
and 
Welfare 
The Medical 
Responsibility 
Board 
 
Patient 
Advisory 
Committees 
(n=21) 
EDs 
(n=45) 
Total n (%) 
Care and treatment 11 146 655
* 
1450  2262 
(24.3) 
Organisation/routines/resources 6 16 334 1405 1761(19.0) 
Unspecified error 0 0 47 1302 1349 
(14.5) 
Information/communication/to 
be treated politely 
18 34 305 771 1128 
(12.1) 
Diagnostic procedures 39 189 0 732 960 (10.3) 
Nursing care 0 2 0 578 580 (6.2) 
Documentation 2 9 0 568 579 (6.2) 
Medication 8 10 0 279 297 (3.2) 
Cooperation 3 0 0 257 260 (2.8) 
Technology, medical 0 0 0 61 61 (0.7) 
Triage 5 10 0 31 46 (0.5) 
Waiting times 0 21 0 0 21 (0.2) 
Total 92 437 1341 7434 9304 (100) 
*Bold numbers represent the highest number of reported errors or complaints per data source. 
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Errors reported to the National Board of Health and Welfare 
Of 428 cases in somatic specialised care, 64 (15%) involved ED care. Because several cases 
contained more than one error, 92 errors were identified and subsequently classified into 
eight categories. Of the reported errors from healthcare providers, 42 % concerned diagnostic 
procedures, followed by errors related to information/communication (19.6%). 
Complaints reported to the Medical Responsibility Board 
From 4628 cases, 306 (6.6%) were found to involve ED care. Because several cases 
contained more than one complaint, 437 complaints involving perceived errors were 
identified and subsequently classified into 11 categories. Errors in diagnostic procedures 
(43.2%) were the most commonly reported complaints from patients, followed by complaints 
related to care and treatment (33.4%). 
Complaints reported to the Patients’ Advisory Committees 
The regional Patients’ Advisory Committees (n=21) reported 1341 patient complaints in ED 
care. Nearly half (48.8%) of these complaints were related to care and treatment. From the 12 
(57%) committees that reported data also at the subcategory level, the main category care and 
treatment comprised the following subcategories: diagnosis/treatment (65.8%), nursing care 
(10.2%), blood specimen collection/examination (2.6%), medication (2.3%), technical 
equipment (0.1%) assistive device (0%) and unspecified (19.0%).  
Errors reported to the local incident reporting systems 
Of the 47 responding EDs, 45 reported 1 666 506 ED visits per year in a catchment area of 6 
612 600 inhabitants (or about 73% of the Swedish population). Of these EDs, 43 reported the 
use of eight incident reporting systems and health care staff reported 7434 errors in ED care 
during 2009. Of these errors, 1450 (19.5%) were related to care and treatment, closely 
followed by 1405 (18. 9%) related to organisation, routines and resources. Of the reported 
7434 errors, 1302 (17.5%) were unspecified. 
  
4.2 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO ERRORS (II) 
In total, there were 157 contributing factors to errors (table 6). In each case at least one (m= 
2.5, SD= 1.0) factor was identified. More than one contributing factor was identified in 50 
(78%) cases, whereas 30 (47%) cases had more than three identified contributing factors. An 
internal investigation had been conducted out in 45 (70%) of the 64 cases in which the care 
providers had identified contributing factors in 44 (69%) cases. As Table 6 illustrates, nine of 
the 10 categories of Cosby’s contributing factors were represented in the data. The most 
common factor was human errors, which were identified in 44 (69%) cases followed by the 
local ED environment and teamwork failure. These three contributing factors constituted 69% 
(n=109) of all identified contributing factors. 
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Table 6. Contributing factors to errors (n= 157) in Swedishs EDs. 
 
Human error 
Human error was identified in 44 (69%) cases and as the single contributing factor in nine 
(14%) of the cases. In five cases there were two types (error in the planning phase or 
execution phase) of human error resulting in a total of 49 human errors. Human errors 
occurred in combination with factors in the local ED environment in 23 cases, most often 
related to flaws in routines followed by lack of support/supervision to junior physicians and 
in four cases to high workload. Overall, the cognitive errors in the planning phase were the 
most common (69%), involving both novice and experienced clinicians in seven cases 
respectively. In 31 (70%) of the cases human error was related to diagnostic procedures, the 
most common being insufficient examination that resulted in either the occurrence of a 
missed or a delayed diagnosis. 
Local ED environment 
In this category three subcategories were identified: routines, resources and high workload. In 
these cases more than one subcategory was found in 11 cases, resulting in a total of 58 
contributing factors related to the local ED environment (table 7). The dominating 
subcategory was routines 53% (n= 31). Missing routines were related to triage that occurred 
because of a lack of decision support and a deficient routine, e.g. that the routines for triage 
performed by RNs were not fully implemented, which resulted in an incorrect triage level. 
High workload was identified as a contributing factor in nine (16%) cases, of which two 
cases were described in the section “description of the case”, and in three cases in the root 
cause analysis.  
  
Factor n (%)  
Human error 
Local ED environment 
Teamwork failure 
Patient factors 
Hospital environment 
Triage 
Outside systems and ED access 
Community 
Hospital administration 
44 
38 
27 
21 
11 
7 
6 
3 
0 
28 
24 
17 
13.5 
7 
4.5 
4 
2 
0 
 
Total 157 100  
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Table 7. Factors in the local ED environment that contributed to errors. 
Subcategories n (%) 
Routines (total) 
   Missing   
    Unspecified  
    Deficient 
31 
12 
10 
9 
53 
21 
17 
16 
Resources (total) 
    Low staff level 
    Space shortage/facilities 
    Lack of support/supervision to  junior  
    doctors  
    Lack of introduction to staff   
18 
4 
2 
9 
 
3 
31 
7 
3 
16 
 
5 
High workload (total) 9 16 
Total 58 100 
 
Teamwork failure 
Communication failures were identified in all 27 cases. Additionally, transfer of written 
information and failure in collaboration were identified in 13 (48%) of the 27 cases. More 
than one type of communication failure was identified in nine cases, resulting in 40 
communication failures. The distribution of communication failures in the ED is represented 
in four subcategories as described in Table 8.  
 
Table 8. The distribution of teamwork failures in errors in ED care. 
Subcategories of teamwork failures  n (%) 
Between team members (total) 12 30 
Between the ED and; (total) 
Nursing home 
EMS (emergency medical service) 
Reception  
ICU (intensive care unit) 
Primary care 
11 
3 
3 
2 
1 
2 
27.5 
7.5 
7.5 
5 
2.5 
5 
Between specialties (total) 9 22.5 
Between clinicians and patient/proxies (total) 8 20 
Total 40 100 
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The fourth most common category of factors contributing to errors was the patient factor, 
which was described in 21 (33%) cases. Of these, a third of the patients (n=7) were described 
with multiple diseases, four (19%) with chronic diseases (physical), and three (14%) with 
mental illness, three (14%) had communication disabilities, two (10%) were under the 
influence of alcohol, one (5%) was unconscious and one (5%) suffered from dementia.  
The hospital environment category, identified in 11 (17%) cases, was related to flaws in the 
electronic health record, low staff level of physicians and lack of inpatient beds, routines and 
technical support. Errors in triage were found in combination with other factors in seven 
(11%) cases, the most common was the local ED environment factor (6 cases). 
The categories outside systems, ED access and community level were identified in 9 (14%) 
cases. In these cases the failure was related to communication failure and therefore they were 
also placed in the category teamwork failure.  
4.3 INTERRUPTIONS IN EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT WORK (III) 
Of the 1882 activities being observed, 184 (10%) were interrupted, which yields a mean rate 
of 5.1 interruptions per hour. Interruptions were observed during 12 of the previously 
identified 15 activities (table 9). The most commonly occurring interruptions were observed 
during information exchange (20%), that is every time clinicians are asking for or giving 
information through interaction with each other, for example, discussing a patient. The 
activity that was most exposed to interruptions in relative terms was preparation of 
medication (29%), followed by documentation (27%) (e.g., signing or dictating a patient’s 
chart), patient/family-nurse/doctor interaction (19%) (all situations where clinicians interact 
with patients or their proxies) and preparation of medical-technical tasks (19%) (e.g., time 
spent working on the computer).   
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Table 9. The distribution of interruptions in observed activities. 
   Frequency of interruptions in activities and for the three groups of clinicians  
(n=18)                           
   
Categories of 
activities 
Frequency 
of observed 
activities  
n 
Frequency 
of 
interruptions 
per each 
category of 
activity 
n (%) 
Physicians 
n (%) 
RNs 
n (%) 
LPNs 
n (%) 
Total 
n (%) 
Preparation of 
medication 
7 2 (28.6) 0 (0.0) 2 (4.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (1.1) 
Documentation 119 32 (26.9) 24 (32.9) 4 (8.0) 4 (6.6) 32 (17.4) 
Patient/family-
nurse/doctor 
interaction 
176 34 (19.3) 10 (13.7) 5 (10.0) 19 
(31.1) 
34 (18.5) 
Preparation of 
medical-
technical tasks 
21 4 (19.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (6.0) 1 (1.6) 4 (2.2) 
Administration
 
133 21 (15.8) 4 (5.5) 8 (16.0) 9 (14.8) 21 (11.4) 
Patient data 
analysis
 
57 8 (14.0) 2 (2.7) 1 (2.0) 5 (8.2) 8 (4.3) 
Transportation
 
117 12 (10.3) 4 (5.5) 3 (6.0) 5 (8.2) 12 (6.5) 
Organisational 
planning
 
20 2 (10.0) 1 (1.4) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.6) 2 (1.1) 
Information 
seeking
 
243 23 (9.5) 10 (13.7) 9 (18.0) 4 (6.6) 23 (12.5) 
Maintenance
 
69 5 (7.2) 0 (0.0) 1 (2.0) 4 (6.6) 5 (2.7) 
Information 
exchange
 
793 37 (4.7) 14 (19.2) 14(28.0) 9 (14.8) 37 (20.1) 
Break
 
104 4 (3.8) 4 (5.5) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 4 (2.2) 
Total 1882 184 73 (100) 50(100) 61(100) 184(100) 
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There were 73 interruptions identified for physicians, 50 for RNs, and 61 for LPNs. 
Collectively, the clinicians were more often recipients of interruptions (63%) than causing 
self-interruptions (37%) (p<0.001). Both physicians’ and RNs were more often recipients of 
interruptions (physicians’ 78%, RNs 66%) than causing self-interruptions (physicians’ 22%, 
RNs 34%) (physicians p< 0,001, RNs p<0.05). The physicians were primarily recipients of 
interruptions while documenting patient care. LPNs (59%) caused self-interruptions 
(p<0.004) to a higher extent as compared with physicians (22%) and RNs (34%). The LPNs 
self-interruptions mostly took place when they were involved in the activity patient/family-
nurse/doctor interaction (e.g., needing to leave the patient alone in the assessment room for a 
short time because of missing equipment).  
Among all clinicians, the most common way to be interrupted was by face-to-face interaction 
with a colleague (51%). Most interrupted activities (n=161, 87.5%), were observed to be 
resumed shortly after the interruption. Of the remaining 23 (12.5%) interrupted activities, 
nine were prematurely terminated before attending to another task, one was handed over to a 
colleague, and the final handling of the 13 interrupted activities was not observed during the 
remaining observation session. The locations at the ED where most of the interruptions 
occurred were at the physicians (19 %) and RNs (49 %) stations. 
The clinicians’ perceptions of interruptions – interview data 
The interview data supported the observation data regarding in which locations of the ED 
clinicians were exposed to interruptions. The clinicians in most cases felt interrupted in the 
nurses’ and physicians’ stations and also in stations with a high workload and in the triage 
area. The question concerning whether the clinicians had to interrupt someone else to be able 
to perform their tasks showed that there was uncertainty among the clinicians if they had 
interrupted someone else. The uncertainty was related to that the clinicians did not remember 
or reflect upon if they interrupted someone else, as it was perceived as a commonplace event.  
Some clinicians used the terms interruption and disturbance as representations of the same 
concept; others, however, distinguished between the two as separate concepts. Further, 
regardless of the terms used (interrupted or disturbed), data from the interviews showed that 
the concept of interruption was not always limited to a negative feeling, i.e. some 
interruptions were perceived as expected and necessary in order to pursue the work process. 
Figure 4 illustrates, whether an interruption was perceived as something negative or not was 
related to whether the interruption disturbed the work process. 
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Figure 4.  A schematic sketch of the categories and subcategories identified in the study. 
The clinicians’ perceptions of interruptions were categorised as either an undisturbed work 
process or a disturbed work process. The most common reasons for clinicians not to perceive 
an interruption as something negative (undisturbed work process) were related to their own 
expectations of the work environment or whether the interruption rate was perceived as low. 
The clinicians’ perceptions in the sub-category expectations of the work environment often 
consisted of thoughts about being interrupted as a natural part of their professional role. An 
example was: “That’s the job at the ED; it is always decisions and you are always 
interrupted; it comes something between” (10: senior physician). This perception was most 
often expressed by the physicians. Another perceptions in the sub-category expectations of 
the work environment was that interruptions were commonplace events. An example was: 
“It’s so commonplace; this is happening every day, so I don’t think of it as an interruption” 
(2: senior LPN).  If the interruption occurred with low frequency (low interruption rate), it 
was not considered as something negative for the on-going work.  
The primary reason for perceiving an interruption as something negative (disturbed work 
process) was clinicians’ exposure to frequent communicative interruptions, mostly by 
colleagues, pagers, or phones. Examples given were: “There are other days when there are 
significantly more calls on the pager than today and then it (disturbance) gets obvious. There 
are usually many more paging’s than there were today” (1: senior physician). Another 
reasons for perceiving an interruption as something negative was if the interruption was 
perceived as irrelevant, “When you get disturbed by, what I think is an irrelevant 
interruption, it is often from wards. Pagings of a non-urgent character that can wait” (7: 
junior physician). Further, having to wait for someone else to get on with the tasks at hand, “I 
get disturbed by having to wait for the person who will help me make a decision. Yes, one 
gets disturbed by waiting” (16: junior physician). Furthermore, missing equipment was 
 
Categories
ss 
Undisturbed work 
process 
Disturbed work  
process 
Infrequent communi-
cative interruptions 
Frequent communi-
cative interruptions 
Missing  
equipment 
Waiting 
Heavy 
workload/overcrowding 
Reprioritization  
of tasks 
Irrelevant 
 interruptions 
Expectations of the work 
environment 
Low interruption  
rate 
Unclear distribution of 
work assignments 
Sub categories Sub categories 
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another reason for being negatively influenced by the interruption, “It was poorly refilled in 
the boxes that I brought in when we would insert the catheter, so then I had to go out and get 
more equipment, this is disturbing because you have to interrupt what you were doing in 
there” (14: junior LPN).  
4.4 PHYSICIANS’ AND NURSES’ (RN) PERCEPTIONS OF PATIENT SAFETY 
RISKS (IV) 
The result reflects a complex professional practice in everyday work. The findings regarding 
physicians and RNs’ perceptions of patient safety risks are presented in four categories: high 
workload, lack of control, communication failures and organisational failures (table 10). The 
10 subcategories represent factors that were perceived by clinicians as patient safety risks in 
the ED. Some general reflections about patient safety risks were expressed by the physicians, 
namely that things could go wrong and that they had to live with it or that is was expected of 
the work environment.  
Table 10. Factors perceived as patient safety risks by physicians and RNs in the ED. 
Theme Categories Subcategories 
Complex 
professional 
practice 
High workload  High patient load 
Critically ill patients  
Lack of control Interruption 
Inexperience 
Communication failures Information gap 
Lack of information 
Organisational failures Unclear ED structure 
Lack of inpatient beds 
Lack of resources 
Electronic health record (EHR) flaws 
Overall, most respondents included high workload as a perceived patient safety risk. Patient 
safety risks related to high workload were seen as causing too long a waiting time until 
assessment. Another perceived risk was not detecting deteriorating patient conditions. 
Further, perceived risks for the patients were mixing up patients. High workload was thought 
to cause time constraints and thus pose a risk for medication error. One RN expressed this 
thought as: “When you don’t have time to double-check and document the medication, it is 
not safe for the patient” (4: RN). High workload was perceived to affect communication: 
“When there is a lot to do, the communication is lacking, which happens quite often’ (RN: 1). 
Interruptions were expressed by both groups of clinicians as risk factors that affect work 
performance. The clinicians stated that interruptions may lead to forgetting things, as 
exemplified in the following quote: “If one has too much in the head and gets interrupted, 
then one forgets” (2: physician).  
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Interruptions make it difficult to concentrate and jeopardise patient safety. Interruptions were 
also experienced as increasing the risk for communication failures and medication errors, as 
exemplified by the following quotes: “We don’t allow each other to complete reports about 
patients without interrupting, even though it may not be important, which means that 
important information may be missed, which happens daily” (8: RN). “One can mix the drug 
incorrectly, but the risk is low because one checks several times” (17: RN).  
The analysis of managing patient safety risks resulted in five categories that reflected 
strategies to prevent errors. Strategies for managing patient safety risks were to check and 
double check, do one thing at a time, rely on and help each other, take command and control, 
and to be thorough.  The most common strategy to prevent errors was to check and double-
check. This practice was thought to prevent medication errors when a healthcare worker was 
being interrupted, as expressed: “The risk of mixing up the drugs is small, because you 
double-check” (17: RN).  
Some RNs used a strategy of taking command and control. The RNs expressed responsibility 
for managing patient safety risks, as conveyed by a RN in a situation with less experienced 
colleagues: “Had to go in and simply take over, even though it was not my patient, but I felt 
that my colleague could not handle it anymore”(16: RN). Another RN said “You have to take 
a lot of responsibility and question when the physician is not sure” (19: RN). Experience may 
be an advantage in preventing medication errors, as expressed by a RN: “From experience, I 
know that it´s not an appropriate prescription” (4: RN). When discussions about who will 
care for the patients were ongoing, a RN stated: “I steer and interfere [to], hasten up the 
decision’ (11: RN). 
5 DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the main findings and methodological considerations from the four 
studies contained in this thesis, followed by conclusions and suggestions for future research 
in this area.   
General discussion of main findings 
This is the first national overview of reported errors and complaints pertaining to ED care in 
Sweden. The main findings were that errors reported from care providers and patients to the 
National Board of Health and Welfare and the Medical Responsibility Board were mainly 
related to diagnostic procedures in which the human error was largely involved. In addition, 
complaints from patients to the Patient Advisory Committees were principally related to care 
and treatment, of which a large part (65.8%) of the complaints was subcategorised as 
diagnosis/treatment. Emergency care was not represented as a specialty in the registries, 
despite the large number of visits to hospital-based EDs in Sweden, which increases yearly. 
The level of information and terms used in the data sources varied considerably, which 
emphasises the need for a national standard in terminology and categorisations of errors in 
national registries. Although they are national agencies, neither the National Board of Health 
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and Welfare nor the Medical Responsibility Board used standardised systems for 
classification or categorisation of error and complaints. 
Contributing factors to errors were multifactorial, with the most common factor being human 
errors, but high workload were rarely identified as a contributing factor in cases from the 
National Board of Health and Welfare neither in the root cause analysis made by care 
providers. This finding is surprising and in contrast to ED clinicians who perceived high 
workload as the main concern for patient safety. The subcategory high workload was 
identified as a contributing factor in nine cases of which three were found as a 
complementary finding in the root cause analysis and two in the description of the case but 
not documented as a contributing factor in the agency’s full text summary. There seems to be 
a degree of uncertainty in these cases as to whether high workload should be considered as a 
contributing factor to errors although a growing body of research indicates that overcrowding, 
which can be related to high workload, constitutes a risk for patient safety (95, 98, 99, 133). 
The reason might be that high workload could be perceived by care providers and healthcare 
managers as a normal state and expected in the ED, or perhaps that the individual approach 
still exists instead of the system approach to errors. If so, there is a risk that situations of risk 
for patient safety are not identified as errors that should have been reported. 
High workload and interruptions were factors identified by ED clinicians as risks for patient 
safety. High workload were rarely identified and interruptions were ever identified in the 
registries used in this thesis. They are factors not always acknowledged or identified as 
contributing to errors in incident reporting systems and analysis of errors (3, 38) although 
they are reported in the literature as contributing factors to errors in the ED (113, 133). Based 
on these findings, one can discuss if high workload deserves more attention as a factor that 
contributes to errors in complex systems such as the ED. ED crowding has been discussed in 
the literature but solutions and interventions to maintain patient safety in the crowded ED are 
lacking (134, 135). This problem may due to organisational difficulties because that many 
solutions to ED crowding concerns also the hospital wards which often have a shortage of 
inpatient beds (4). In Sweden, the number of hospital-based EDs has decreased, whereas ED 
visits and patients’ length of stay have increased (102). Thus, crowding still remains a patient 
safety risk.  
ED clinicians from the two participating EDs in paper IV could identify situations at risk for 
patient safety with the most common strategy to prevent errors being to check and double-
check. Some RNs reported to taking command and control when patient safety was 
jeopardised which indicates that RNs may play an important role for patient safety, which 
supports findings from previous international studies (86, 136, 137). 
Reported errors and complaints and contributing factors to errors 
The finding that the most commonly reported errors and complaints were related to 
diagnostic procedures is consistent with previous reports (55, 56, 67). Errors in the diagnostic 
process can result in delayed or missed diagnoses and are more likely to occur in the ED, 
resulting in more severe harm to patients than other errors (64, 66, 67).  
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Based on the four data sources used in this study, 9304 errors and complaints were reported 
from ED care in 2009, of which 7434 were directed to local incident reporting systems. 
According to the calculations reported by the National Board of Health and Welfare in 2004, 
approximately 1 000 000 errors annually are reported to local incident reporting systems 
representing all Swedish healthcare areas. Thus, less than 1% of all reported errors to local 
incident reporting systems in the study took place at the ED. This finding, however, is not 
reliable because of the assumed underreporting. Eight local incident reporting systems in use 
were reported and the categorisations were similar but a substantial proportion of errors could 
not be specified. Too many complex and different reporting systems in use complicate 
making comparisons and probably contribute to underreporting (45). 
The contributing factors to errors in EDs were multifactorial in nature and consisted of factors 
that included both organisational factors in the local environment, as well as teamwork 
failure. The most common factor was the human error in 44 of 64 (69 %) cases, a result 
consistent with other findings (59, 64, 67, 138). In this study human errors were mainly 
related to diagnostic procedures where the most common were errors in planning. This 
finding agrees with other findings (64, 67). Human errors were represented in 23 (36 %) 
cases together with factors in the local environment. These human errors were most often 
related to flaws in routines and in four cases to high workload. Applying the system approach 
to these errors, it can be assumed that the human errors in this study were affected by 
organisational factors such as high workload, that are known to affect humans negatively in 
complex sociotechnical systems (26, 29, 35). Interruptions in the care process and crowding 
in the ED are considered risk factors for patient safety in some studies (64, 123) but not in 
others (58, 59). This contradiction may be the result of using different models to identify and 
categorise contributing factors that may not be adapted to disclose latent system problems 
that affect human behaviour. Alternatively, perhaps common working conditions in the ED, 
such as frequent interruptions, overcrowding and multitasking that are assumed to have a 
negative impact on patient safety are perceived as normal and expected in the ED by staff, 
care providers and healthcare managers (139).  
Failures in communication and teamwork are the leading contributors to serious errors 
according to the Joint Commission on accreditation of Healthcare Organization in the USA 
(83). However, communication failures were not the leading contributor to errors in this 
study, perhaps because communication failures are not always easy to identify when 
communication load is high and one of the most common activities (71, 77, 81, 82). The 
finding that internal investigations and root cause analysis are not always carried out and that 
mandatory information is missing is consistent with a previous review of Lex Maria cases 
from all health care areas in 2012 (44). Further, of 175 Lex Maria cases reported during two 
years in a Swedish county council, 118 (67%) had been analysed using root cause analysis 
and half of these cases were judged to be of low quality such as that information was missing 
about e.g. contributing factors to errors (140). The lack of internal investigations and that 
information is missing may create a risk of missing important patient safety risks and limits 
the development of solutions that can improve patient safety. 
  39 
Interruptions in ED work 
The mean interruption rate of 5.1 per hour for all the clinicians in this study was low 
compared with findings in other studies reporting twice as many interruptions for physicians 
and RNs in the ED (107, 111, 113, 121). One explanation might be that the workload at the 
EDs was relatively low during the data collection period. Several other factors also need to be 
considered, including countries, type of ED, the length of the observations and that different 
terms and definitions of interruption are used in the literature, all of which makes it difficult 
to compare studies (105, 107, 119). The findings that face-to-face interruptions were most 
common concurs with other studies (111, 116, 130). The highest number of interruptions 
occurred during information exchange, which also was the most common activity. This 
finding is consistent with other studies reporting that communication load is high in the ED 
(71, 77, 79). The most commonly interrupted activity in relative terms was preparation of 
medication (28.6%), a result similar to that of another study in which interruptions during 
medication-related activities accounted for 27.5% of all interruptions (116). This type of 
interruption is of particular concern because, medication errors are known to occur frequently 
in the ED and that interruptions during preparation of medication increase the risk for error 
(121, 141).  
The main finding from the interviews was that clinicians did not always perceive 
interruptions as something negative. In this study, an interruption was perceived as negative 
when it was related to a disturbed work process, including high workload. Having to wait 
disturbs or delays clinicians’ work processes, even though the interruption is not face-to-face 
and not obvious to the observer. This observation confirms previous findings that have 
presented waiting times using different terms (such as impediments/delays) that cause delays 
in the workflow (111, 142). The finding that clinicians perceived interruptions as 
commonplace events and did not remember if they had to interrupt someone else raises 
questions about how to manage and decrease unnecessary interruptions, if the clinicians are 
not always aware of when they occur. 
 Patient safety risks in the ED 
The focus of this study was to identify factors that ED clinicians perceived as patient safety 
risks and how they managed these factors. The main finding was that factors perceived as 
risks were multifactorial and involved situations related to both organisational factors and 
interactions between staff members. The most common factor perceived as a risk for patient 
safety was high workload. Communication and interruptions were perceived to be negatively 
affected by high workload. High workload is a related phenomenon to overcrowding (94). 
The finding that high workload was perceived as one of the main patient safety risks is in 
accordance with international findings (91, 98, 133, 143). Patient safety has been identified to 
be compromised by overcrowding and has been associated with medication errors, patient 
mortality and poor care for patients with severe pain (91, 95, 97, 100).  
  
 40 
In addition to high workload, communication failures and interruptions were perceived by 
ED staff as common risks for patient safety, which is consistent with other findings (123, 
144). In this study, both high workload and interruptions were expressed by RNs as risks for 
medication errors.  
5.1 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There are several limitations with the data used in paper I and II. The main limitation is the 
assumed underreporting that occurs in reporting systems (40, 45, 47). Paper I provides a 
presentation of only reported errors and complaints of perceived errors. Therefore, the results 
can only be used as an indication of the number of errors that actually occurred in ED care. 
However, the data provide knowledge about what types of errors that are reported. In a few 
cases the complaints from patients were related to waiting times, which did not necessarily 
result in an error. Patients are suggested to be reliable in reporting errors (52, 53) and waiting 
times can be seen as a risk factor for patients in a crowded ED. The level of detail of 
information and terms used varied within and between the different data sources. This 
variation is probably the result of lack of standardisation in terminology and categorisation of 
errors. The categorisation of errors reported to local incident reporting systems varied, 
although the categorisations were similar. The participating EDs reported eight local incident 
reporting systems in use and a substantial part of the errors was unspecified. However, this 
thesis provides the first overview and characterisation of reported errors and complaints in 
emergency care in Sweden.  
Emergency Care is not categorised as a specialty of its own in the registries of the National 
Board of Health and Welfare. Therefore, cases in the first screening stage might have been 
missed although the inclusion criteria were deliberately broad and the screening process was 
reviewed and discussed within the research team. Another limitation is that some information 
may have been omitted because the cases in full texts were summaries made by the agency 
and interviews with staff. Further, inspections made by the agency were not reproduced in 
their entirety. The cases also varied in level of detail and categorisation of errors were 
lacking. Another limitation is that, despite mandatory regulations that internal investigations 
have to be conducted by health care providers, 19 cases were found to be missing. Further, 
reported injury claims to the Patient Insurance were not included in the study. The 
categorisations of errors and complaints were influenced by categoriations used in the other 
registries and from the literature. To strengthen credibility, an independent analysis on a 
sample of cases from the National Board of Health and Welfare and the Medical 
Responsibility Board was made by four of the researches in the researchgroup.  
In paper II, an already existing framework by Cosby was used to categorise contributing 
factors to errors in the 64 cases reported to the National Board of Health and Welfare. To our 
knowledge no other framework to categorise ED errors exists. A limitation was that the 
framework was not yet validated and has been used previously only in one setting. A strength 
was that the model was developed based on hundreds of cases from a similar setting, an 
urban public teaching hospital-based ED. Another limitation, previously mentioned, is that 
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some information in the 64 cases may have been missing. Because the cases in full texts were 
summaries made by the agency and because interviews with staff and inspections made by 
the agency were not reproduced in their entirety, contributing factors might have been 
missed. The framework is probably best suited to be used in a root cause analysis and not 
retrospectively in a summary of a case. The framework used the category “human error” as a 
contributing factor to errors. Such an approach may be questioned in the sense that it 
indicates an individual approach instead of system approach. Hence, it might lead to the 
possibility that healthcare staff perceive that the individual blame still has preference, a belief 
that may negatively affect incident reporting (145). According to the system approach to 
patient safety, even if the primary cause of an error is systems failures, active errors pass 
through the hands of a human. Most of these active errors seem to be reported. Further, the 
categories in the framework are broad. Both cases of errors and root cause analysis vary in 
level of detail and seem to fail to some extent capturing the latent errors. Although the size of 
the sample was small and the categories of errors can be judged as general, the study does 
provide a national overview of contributing factors to errors based on reported cases from 
Swedish EDs. Such an overview, has not previously been presented.  
In paper III, both observations and interviews were conducted. The authors’ and the pre-
understanding might have influenced the observations as well as the interpretation of the 
interviews. On the other hand, pre-understanding of the study context as well as using two 
observers facilitated the capturing of details of activities and interruptions. Credibility in the 
data collection was ensured by concurrent data collection by two researchers. Using 
observations and interviews in the data collection also strengthened the credibility and 
dependability. The interviews were made immediately after the observation period. Because 
the clinicians were still on duty, they might have felt time pressure, pressure that could have 
had a negative effect on the richness of data from the interviews. However, our intention was 
to minimise the time between the observations and the interviews so that the clinicians could 
reflect upon their perceptions of interruptions that had occurred during their two hours of 
observation. The observations were not made in all week days and during some of the 
observations the workload was considered low by the observers. The use of a structured 
protocol at two EDs and ensuring a variation of the clinicians’ age, gender, profession and 
experience strengthen the credibility and transferability of the findings. Further, independent 
analysis of interviews were made by four of the researchers in the research group, as well as 
repeated discussions about categories to reach consensus. 
However, a limitation was that the perceptions of interruptions expressed by the clinicians 
were referring both to the observation periods and to their work experience in general. Both 
expressions were included in the analysis to get broader perspective on the phenomenon in 
question. The concepts interruption and disturbance were used synonymously by the 
clinicians, which complicated the analysis. In the analysis efforts were made to assure that the 
inherent meaning of the answers was categorised correctly rather than focusing on the 
concept used by the clinicians.  
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In paper IV, the interviews about the participants’ perceptions of patient safety risks were 
conducted by telephone by two professional interviewers with no experience or familiarity 
with the ED context, which might have limited the richness of the interviews. My pre-
understanding of the ED work environment might have influenced the analysis of the 
interview data. However, a combination of experience from everyday work in practice and 
research gives a perspective from two directions that can be an advantage. The analysis was 
also made together with researchers not familiar with the ED context, in an effort to broad the 
perspective. To strengthen credibility, an independent analysis on a sample of cases was 
made by four of the researches in the research group and the categorisations were discussed 
until consensus was achieved. To further strengthen credibility and transferability the 
interviews were conducted with participants from two EDs, with participants from different 
professions and of various ages, both genders and a varied level of experience. Because the 
findings are consistent with those in similar settings (90) and because the interviews were 
conducted with varying professions and both genders at two Swedish EDs, transferability to 
other Swedish EDs is likely possible.   
5.2 CONCLUSION 
 Errors and complaints reported by care providers and patients in Swedish emergency 
departments were mainly related to diagnostic procedures, treatment and 
organisational matters. The level of information detail varied and was sometimes 
missing in the different national and local registires. Internal investigations and root 
cause analysis were sometimes missing entirely. These shortcomings constitute a risk 
of missing important patient safety risks, a fact that limits the development of 
solutions that can improve patient safety. 
 The most common contributing factors to errors in cases reported to the National 
Board of Health and Welfare were human errors that occurred most often during 
diagnostic procedures, followed by factors in the local environment and teamwork 
failure. High workload were rarely identified and interruptions were ever identified as 
a contributing factor.  
 Most interruptions occurred during information exchange and preparation of 
medication was the activity most interrupted in relative terms. 
 Interruptions were not always seen as negative by emergency care clinicians, but only 
when the interruptions resulted in a disturbed work process. 
 Clinicians perceived high workload as the main patient safety concern in the ED. 
Interruptions during high workload were viewed as increasing the risk for 
communication and medication errors.  
 The most common strategy emergency care clinicians used to prevent errors was to 
check and double check. Some RNs reported taking command and control when 
patient safety was jeopardised. 
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5.3 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The main contribution of this thesis is advancing our knowledge about errors, interruptions 
and patient safety risks in the ED.  
Clinical implications 
The results underscore the need for a standardisation of terms and categorisations of reported 
errors and complaints in national registries and in local incident reporting systems for the 
purpose of facilitating the compilation of error types.  
National registries for errors and complaints should be organised so that cases from 
emergency care can be identified and easily compiled to enhance quality improvement in ED 
care.  
Information and education as well as user friendly incident reporting systems are needed to 
facilitate and increase reporting to minimise uncategorised errors and underreporting.  
Internal investigations and root cause analysis of errors can be improved by emphasising the 
system approach to enable identification of latent errors. 
Staff members at EDs should be involved in patient safety work so they can identify and 
increase knowledge about latent risk factors, as well as to help develop strategies that 
maintain patient safety. 
Staff need to be attentive as to when negative effects of interruptions are to be expected, 
such as during high workload, and especially during medication management activities. 
Further actions may include the creation of interruption free zones or the use of signs by 
clinicians to alert others when interruptions should be avoided (e.g., during the preparation 
of medications).  
Development of guidelines or routines in how to manage high workload that are in line with 
how strategies and plans exist to manage catastrophic events is needed to minimise the risk 
of errors. High workload in the ED should be acknowledged as a risk factor rather than as a 
normal state.  
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Future research 
As previously noted, this thesis has contributed to our knowledge about patient safety in the 
ED in terms of errors, interruptions and patient safety risks. However, future research is 
needed to study errors and interruptions in the ED and how to design research studies in 
complex environments. Areas of special interest are the following: 
 to study errors that are not reported by ED staff and to determine why they are 
not reported. 
 to determine whether patients in Swedish EDs can contribute to identifying 
errors. 
 to identify, analyse and compare processes in the ED in which errors do and do 
not occur. 
 to study the relation between interruptions and errors. 
 to define and distinguish a negative interruption from a neutral and positive 
interruption 
 to study interventions to reduce negative interruptions.   
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6 SVENSK SAMMANFATTNING 
Hälso- och sjukvård är i huvudsak till stor nytta för patienter men är också en verksamhet 
fylld med risker som kan leda till att patienter skadas. Dessa skador eller komplikationer kan 
resultera i dödsfall, invaliditet eller förlängda vårdtider. Studier från andra länder har 
rapporterat att skador och komplikationer drabbar ungefär var tionde patient och att upp till 
50 % av dessa var orsakade av hälso- och sjukvården och kunde därför ha undvikits. I 
Sverige publicerades 2009 en studie genomförd av Socialstyrelsen där en granskning av 
vårdtillfällen under ett år fann att skador inträffat vid ungefär 12 % av vårdtillfällena, av vilka 
70 % bedömdes kunde ha undvikits.  
I rapporten To err is human som publicerades 1999 av the Institute of Medicine i USA 
angavs att upp till 98 000 amerikanska patienter dog årligen till följd av skador som orsakats 
av hälso- och sjukvården. Den här rapporten anses vara startskottet för ett ökat intresse och 
forskning gällande patientsäkerhet. I rapporten föreslogsåtgärder för att förbättra 
patientsäkerheten och man betonade ett systemperspektiv, d.v.s. att orsaken till att skador 
inträffar ligger på organisatorisk nivå och inte på en enskild individ. System perspektivet har 
också implementerats i den svensk hälso- och sjukvården genom den nya 
Patientsäkerhetslagen och bildandet av Inspektionen för Vård och Omsorg (IVO).   
Akutmottagningar har en central roll i hälso- och sjukvården eftersom en stor del av 
patienterna har sin första kontakt med sjukhusvård på en akutmottagning. Akutmottagningar 
har beskrivits som komplexa och dynamiska system där avvikelser ofta inträffar. Forskning 
om patientsäkerhet på akutmottagningar har växt internationellt de senaste åren, där resultat 
indikerar att överbelastning, frekventa avbrott och multitasking (att hantera flera 
arbetsuppgifter samtidigt) alla är bidragande faktorer till avvikelser. Sådan forskning saknas 
dock i stor utsträckning vad gäller den svenska akutmottagningssjukvården.  
Det övergripande syftet för avhandlingen, som består av fyra delarbeten, var därför att öka 
kunskapen om avvikelser, avbrott och personalens uppfattningar om patientsäkerhetsrisker på 
akutmottagningen. De specifika syftena i delarbete I och II var att beskriva förekomst och typ 
av rapporterade avvikelser och klagomål gällande akutmottagningsvård samt deras 
bidragande faktorer. Syftet i delarbete III var att undersöka förekomsten av avbrott som 
personal på akutmottagningen blir utsatt för och deras uppfattning om avbrott. Slutligen, i 
delarbete IV, var syftet att beskriva personalens uppfattning om och hanterande av 
patientsäkerhetsrisker. Från nationella register och genom observationer och intervjuer med 
akutmottagningspersonal inhämtades kvalitativa och kvantitativa data.  Registerdata, 
observationer och intervjuer sammanställdes och kategoriserades med icke parametrisk 
statistik och innehållsanalys. 
I delarbete I inhämtades uppgifter om avvikelser och klagomål rapporterade under 2009 från 
Socialstyrelsen (Lex Maria), Hälso-och sjukvårdens ansvarsnämnd (HSAN) och 
Patientnämnderna i alla landsting. Enkät med frågor om rapporterade avvikelser i lokala 
incidentrapporteringssystem skickades till 72 sjukhusbundna akutmottagningar för vuxna. 
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Resultatet visade att rapporterade avvikelser till Socialstyrelsen och HSAN oftast var 
relaterade till diagnostik. Rapporterade avvikelser till Patientnämnderna och de lokala 
incidentrapporteringssystemen på akutmottagningarna var oftast relaterade till vård och 
behandling. I alla register sammantaget så var den vanligaste kategorin av avvikelser och 
klagomål relaterat till vård och behandling (24.3 %) följt av organisatoriska avvikelser (19.0 
%) och en stor andel avvikelser var inte specificerade (14.5 %).  
I delarbete II granskades 64 Lex Maria fall som involverade akutmottagningsvård och 
rapporterats till Socialstyrelsen under 2009. Totalt identifierades 157 bidragande faktorer och 
mer än en bidragande faktor (m=2.5, SD=1.0) till avvikelsen identifierades i 50 (78 %) av 
fallen. Den mest förekommande bidragande faktorn var den mänskliga faktorn i 44 fall, följt 
av organisatoriska faktorer på akutmottagningen i 38 fall och faktorer relaterade till 
kommunikation i 27 fall. Dessa tre faktorer utgjorde totalt 69 % av de bidragande faktorerna.  
I det tredje delarbetet observerades sammanlagt 18 läkare, sjuksköterskor och 
undersköterskor från två olika akutmottagningar under två timmars tjänstgöring på 
akutmottagningen. Av sammanlagt 1882 observerade aktiviteter avbröts 184 (10 %), vilket är 
cirka 5 avbrott i timmen. Kommunikation var den aktivitet där flest (20 %) avbrott 
observerades. Iordningställande av läkemedel var den aktivitet som oftast blev avbruten i 
relativa tal (29 %) följt av dokumentation (27 %). Avbrott upplevdes inte alltid som negativa. 
Informanterna upplevde avbrott som störande då avbrotten skedde frekvent eller inträffade 
under hög arbetsbelastning. 
I det sista delarbetet intervjuades 10 läkare och 10 sjuksköterskor från två akutmottagningar 
angående deras uppfattning om patientsäkerhetsrisker och hur de hanterar dessa. Resultatet 
visade att hög arbetsbelastning, brister i kommunikation och avbrott upplevdes som de 
huvudsakliga riskerna för patientsäkerheten. En vanlig strategi för att förhindra att något ska 
gå fel, till exempel att förväxla läkemedel var att dubbelkontrollera sig själv. Vissa 
sjuksköterskor uttryckte att de känner ansvar för patientsäkerheten och att de kan ta kontroll 
över situationer där de upplever att patientsäkerheten är hotad. 
Sammanfattningsvis så visar resultatet att rapporterade avvikelser och klagomål från 
vårdgivare, sjukvårdspersonal och patienter till störst del är relaterat till diagnostik, vård och 
behandling samt organisatoriska faktorer. Flera bidragande faktorer till en avvikelse kunde 
identifieras i de fall som rapporterats till Socialstyrelsen (Lex Maria). Den mest 
förekommande bidragande orsaken var den mänskliga faktorn. Läkare och sjuksköterskor 
upplevde hög arbetsbelastning, brister i kommunikation och avbrott som de största 
patientsäkerhetsriskerna. De flesta avbrotten som personalen utsattes för var av varandra och 
oftast avbröts kommunikation. Avbrott upplevdes dock inte alltid negativt, de upplevdes 
negativ om det skedde ofta och under hög arbetsbelastning. 
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